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Schmertz: Honorable Frank A. Gulotta Lecture Nassau County Bar Association

HOFSTRA LABOR LAW JOURNAL
Spring 1988

Volume 5, No. 2

SPEECH

HONORABLE FRANK A. GULOTTA
LECTURE
NASSAU COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION
JANUARY 28, 1987
Eric J. Schmertz*
Justice Gulotta, Distinguished members of the Judiciary, President-Elect Hoffman, Dean Simon, Chairperson Zalayet, members
and friends of the Nassau County Bar Association and its Academy
of Law, ladies and gentlemen.
For at least four reasons, I am immensely honored by the invitation to make this talk. I am honored by my resultant identification
with such an eminent, respected, and beloved jurist-the Honorable
* A.B., Union College; J.D., New York University; LL.D., Union College; Dean of the
Hofstra University School of Law and Edward F. Carlough Distinguished Professor of Labor
Law.
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Frank A. Gulotta.' I am honored to talk before a Bar Association
that I consider to be one of the most active, most imaginative and
most collegial in this country. The history of our democratic society
is one of delicate balance between absolute freedom and societal regulation. I suggest that the present debate over the propriety and
methods of mandatory drug testing is the most recent dilemma requiring that delicate balance. Involuntary blood tests to determine
use and quantity of alcohol are common in the employment setting-both private and public-and is a legitimate ground for discipline. 1 What is different about the testing of urine to discover the use
of controlled substances 2-- is in part just that. The search is not just
for discovery of drugs, but discovery of what in many jurisdictions
constitutes a criminal offense. Even in those states where the drug of
marijuana has been "decriminalized," 3 its possession and use-even
its personal use-is still an "offense" and in that sense anti-social.4
Consequently, the stigma of a crime, or even an offense, heightens
the controversy and the debate. But of greater difference, in my
view, is the privacy of the body function involved, the act of urination, and the taking of a urine specimen. It is that private body function that becomes exposed and disclosed when urine testing is required. It triggers emotional responses and intensifies attention to
"privacy rights," the constitutional protection against "search and
seizure," the issues of confidentiality, test accuracy and fundamental
due process. At the risk of over-simplification, I suggest that, absent
that emotional component, urine testing for drug use and abuse may
not be that different from many other restraints on absolute freedom
that society has properly and understandably imposed on us.
As lawyers, I think we would agree that the government, as an
1. See McDonell v. Hurter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130, n.6 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Amalgamated Transit Union (AFL-CIO) v. Susey, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir. 1976). But see
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482, 291 (N.D. Ga. 1985).

2. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), through the Controlled Substances Act 21
U.S.C. § 201(G) et seq has listed drugs as being controlled on different schedules. Schedule I
substances are drugs that have a high potential for abuse, have no currently medically accepted use in the U.S., and lack safety for use under medical supervision. Examples of Schedule I drugs are various opiates, opium derivatives (e.g., heroin and morphine), LSD, mari-

juana, mescaline and peyote. Schedule II substances are drugs that have a high potential for
abuse, have currently accepted medical use, with severe restrictions, in the U.S., and whose
abuse could lead to severe psychological or physical dependance. 2 Food Drug Cosm. L. Rep.

(CCH) 1 80,017-80,019 (August 3, 1987).
3. Some of the states that have decriminalized marijuana are Oregon (1973), Colorado,
Alaska, Ohio, California (1975), Maine, Minnesota (1976), Mississippi, North Carolina, New
York (1977), and Nebraska (1978). Inciardi, Marijuana Decriminalization Research: A Perspective and Commentary, 19 Criminology 145, 151 (1981).

4. Id. at 146-147.
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employer, and private employers have the right to discover and to
bar or remove from their employment drug users and abusers. And if
urine testing is the most accurate method presently available, that
procedure should not be prohibited. Safety, product quality, commercial reputation, and employee morale are and have been the defensible grounds.5
However, as lawyers, I think we would also agree that affected
employees are entitled to essential due process.6 Their jobs and reputations should not be jeopardized or stigmatized by urine testing that
is inaccurate, that lacks confidentiality, that is undertaken without
justifiable reason or is utilized disriminatorily.
And therein lies the critical-indeed essential-role of the lawyer. It is the lawyer who understands due process, probative evidence, fair play, the inestimable value of reputation. I would not
leave a mandatory drug testing program to the doctors, bureaucrats,
government officials or to the business community. The drafting, or
at least review, of substance abuse programs, their implementation,
their results, and actions taken call for a lawyer's role. And as the
cases begin to develop, it will be clear that what is at issue is not
whether there should be mandatory testing of urine to discover drug
use and abuse, but how it is to be done within the frame of the
delicate balance between its legitimate need and the freedom and
privacy rights of affected employees.
The use and abuse of drugs-marijuana, cocaine, heroin, crack,
amphetamines, etc.-is probably the most serious domestic affliction
that has faced our nation in its entire history, with the gravest of
consequences to the health, welfare and productivity of our society.
Judge Irving R. Kaufman stated in his article in the New York
Times Magazine that "drug testing is shaping up as the premier issue in labor relations for the next decade."'7 It has been reported that
twenty million Americans use marijuana at least once a month.8 Six
5. See Drug Testing in the Workplace, 43 Record of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York 447, 448-449 (1988).
6. See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1 IER Case 1076 (D.D.C. 1986) (Employee bus driver was denied due process when discharged without a hearing after one urine
test indicated use of marijuana); see also, Caputa v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1
IER Case 625 (D.C. N.J. 1986) (Denying fire fighter opportunity to have urine retested by

technician of his own choice was denial of due process.
7. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986 § 6 (Magazine) at 52.
8. Id. at 54.
Recent figures state that three million Americans smoke marijuana once a day and anywhere
from 50,000 to 750,000 use cocaine every day. Another study revealed that fifteen to twenty

million Americans smoke marijuana regularly and five to six million regularly use cocaine. 43
Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Drug Testing In the Workplace
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million use cocaine at least once a month. 9 Sixty-five percent of to-

day's entering work force has used some illegal or controlled drug. 10
Close to one half of youths recruited for military service are disqualified because of drug use. It drains 60 billion dollars each year from
the economy.11 It is the life blood of organized crime and is the proximate cause of a high percentage of crimes.12 The depth of the problem cannot be exaggerated.
The response has been to test, or to attempt to test, urine (subject to legal and arbitral challenges). The roll call of those testing or
trying to test include: federal employees;' 3 municipal police, 4 fire,' 0
and transportation 6 employees; Major League baseball players;"7
447, 477, n.2 (1988).
9. N.Y. Times, October 19, 1986 § 6 (magazine) at 54.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. The signing of Executive Order 12564 by President Reagan was an important step
in the President's goal of a drug-free federal workplace. To assist in carrying out this order,
Congress enacted the 1987 Supplemental Appropriations Act, which made it incumbent upon
various agencies to develop guidelines for such testing. The plan will cover approximately 1.1
million federal employees, and recently included U.S. Postal Service employees, who were
originally exempt from coverage. The judicial branch, legislative branch, and uniformed military service personnel are, at present, exempt. IERM 595: 501 et seq.
14. The Third Circuit held that a police department could require its officers to undergo
urinalysis whether or not there was suspicion of individual drug use. The court reasoned that
the "highly regulated" nature of the profession invoked the administrative-search exception to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Policemen's Benevolent Assn. Local 318
v. Washington, 3 IER Cases 699 (3rd Cir. 1988). A District Court in Illinois citing public
safety as a primary interest, ruled that urinalysis tests that were part of a routine medical
examination for officers who were returning to the force after 30 days of leave was a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Wrightsell v. Chicago, 678 F. Supp. 727, 2 IER
Cases 1614 (N.D. Ill. 1988). See also Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dept., 2 IER Cases
1825 (3rd Cir. 1988) (Policeman, after traces of marijuana were found in his urine, had no
claim that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated). But see Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, 3
IER Cases 691 (6th Cir. 1988) (Urinalysis of police and firefighters deemed violative of the
Fourth Amendment).
15. In City of East Point v. Smith, 3 IER Cases 157 (Ga. 1988), the testing if a
firefighter's urine solely to test for marijuana was reasonable under the Georgia constitution.
But see Lovvorn v. Chattanooga, Penny v. Kennedy, supra.
16. A federal district court in New York recently held that urinalysis testing of city
transit authority employees or applicants in safety-related positions was not an unreasonable
search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Burka v. NYC Transit Authority, 2 IER
Cases 1625 (S.D. N.Y. 1988).
17. Major League baseball has no express agreement as to testing its players for drugs.
Brock, MeKenna, Drug Testing in Sports, 92 Dick. L. Rev. 505, 518 (Spring 1988) (Citing
The Application of San Francisco's Testing Ordinance to the San Francisco Giant Baseball
Club and San Francisco 49'ers Football Club, San Francisco Attorney Opinion No. 86-04
(March 28, 1987) (unpublished op. at 8)). In the 1986 preseason, Commissioner Peter Ucberoth attempted to institute a drug testing program and later a mandatory drug testing program
for all league players, but this was rejected by the Major League Baseball Players Association.
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National Football League players,"8 National Basketball Association
players; 19 IBM.20

One of the reasons this topic was selected is because, by chance,
I was the arbitrator in what turned out to be a leading arbitration

case on drug testing between Bath Iron Works (in Maine) and Locals 6 and 7 of the Marine and Ship Builders Union AFL-CIO
which I decided in June of last year.2 ' As that case was widely reported in the reporting services, in newspaper articles and editorials
in New England, and widely discussed and cited in government circles in Washington, D.C., it is proper for me to discuss it with you.
The issues raised in that case are all the issues generally considered

by the courts in both public and private employment. I think, respectfully, that my decision in response to those issues was consistent
with the present majority view of the courts. The Bath Iron Works is
the country's leading builder of fighting ships for the U.S. Navy. Its
employees are represented by two unions-the clerical force by one
local and the production employees by the other. The latter employees are skilled metal workers, welders, electricians, carpenters,
Brock & McKenna at 521 (citing Wong and Eisnor, Major League Baseball and Drugs: Fight
the Problem or the Player? 11 Nova L. Rev. 779, 795 (1987)). Eventually, drug testing
clauses were inserted by various clubs in the contracts of over 550 players. However, later
arbitration held that these contracts violated Major League Baseball's collective bargaining
agreement. Thus, all these clauses were void. Brock and McKenna at 521.
18. The National Football League permits testing in some situations. For example, a
club physician may test a player as part of the standard preseason physical. An athlete may
also be tested upon reasonable cause by the club physician. "Spot" testing by the league is
prohibited. There is nothing in the player collective bargaining agreement that provides for
postseason testing. Brock & McKenna at 522-523.
19. The National Basketball Association policy is as follows:
The Anti-Drug Agreement provides that any player who is convicted of, or pleads
guilty to a crime involving the use of cocaine, or is found, through the procedures
outlined in the Agreement, to have illegally used these drugs, shall immediately be
permanently dismissed from the League. Said player may, however, appeal for reinstatement after two years, requiring the approval of both the Commissioner and the
Players' Association.
Brock & McKenna at 528 (citing Release, The Anti-Drug Program of the National Basketball Association & the National Basketball Association Players' Association-Overview of
the NBA's Anti-Drug Program (undated).
20. Managers who suspect that an IBM employee has a drug problem can refer that
employee to the company physician. It is then up to the physician to determine whether or not
a drug test is necessary. Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 2 (March 29, 1988).
The Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. (3M) recently announced that it would begin
implementing a drug and alcohol testing program to its 44,000 employees. The policy behind
the test is not punative; rather, it is to offer help to those employees who have drug problems.
Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 4 (April 12, 1988).
21. In the Matter of Arbitration Between Local 6 and Local 7, IUMSWA, AFL-CIO
and Bath Iron Works Corporation. Opinion and Award (June 1986) (Unpublished opinion).
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draftsmen, marine designers, and heavy equipment operators.
In the spring of 1986 the Secretary of the Navy and several
admirals inspected the Bath Shipyard. They reported that they saw
some shipyard employees smoking marijuana, and that some employees told them that marijuana was being used on the job. The Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations wrote the President of Bath informing him of their findings, reminding him that the
law prohibited the placing of Navy contracts with a contractor employing personnel using drugs, and expressing confidence that Bath
would take remedial steps. Subsequently, Bath unilaterally promulgated, without Union participation, a comprehensive Substance
Abuse Policy. Its principal provisions were:
(1) Random urine testing of all employees. Tests were to be conducted by the Company's medical department, by technicians-not necessarily by a physician.
(2) Testing of employees thought by any member of management
to be using drugs or "under the influence of drugs"-in other
words, testing on basis of "reasonable or probable cause."
(3) Testing of urine by a process call Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique System [EMIT].22 If the result was positive the employee was suspended, pending confirmation of the
EMIT test by the process of gas chromotography/mass
spectometry.2 3 If positive is confirmed the employee remains
suspended for 30 days. If still positive at the end of 30
22. An easy to understand explanation of the "EMIT" test can be found in The Record
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1988). The description is as follows:
[The "EMIT"] detects drug use by attaching an enzyme to either a sample or a
metabolite of the drug use by attaching an enzyme to either a sample or a metabolite of the drug to be detected (the "labeled drug"). The urine specimen is then
mixed with a reagent containing antibodies to the drug and the labeled drug is
mixed with the specimen. The enzyme in the labeled drug will react with any remaining antibodies to the drug, thereby reducing the enzyme activity. The level of
enzyme activity is directly related to the concentration of free drug present in the
urine sample.
Drug Testing in the Workplace, 43 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, 447, 453 (1988).
23.
Gas chromatography/mass spectrometry ("GC/MS") identifies drug use by analyzing the molecular structure of the chemicals in a urine sample. Although it is highly
accurate, it is less widely used due to costs (fifty to eighty dollars per test as compared to five to ten dollars per test for EMIT) and the substantial technical expertise required to conduct the test. However, the method is more sensitive in that it
can detect drugs at a lower rate than the immunoassay tests.
Id. at 454. A recent study indicated that the gas chromatography/mass spectrometry test
yields accuracy of "99 percent plus." Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 4 (March 17,
1987).
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(4)

days-he is discharged. If no longer positive, he is returned to
work without back pay and subject to spot testing thereafter.
If the EMIT test is not confirmed, the employee is reinstated.
A positive test is not the presence of anydrug quantity, but a
quantity deemed to be at an "impairment level" or "under
the influence." For marijuana it is 100 nanagrams of marijuana acid.

The Company defended its action on the following grounds:
(1)

It had the right to protect the safety of its employees and the
safety of its production methods.
(2) It had the right to protect the quality of its product and insure against defects.
(3) It had the right to take steps to protect its contracts with the
Navy.
(4) It had the right, as a managerial prerogative, to promulgate
reasonable work rules-including discipline for offenses.
(5) It had the right to protect its reputation as a supplier of naval
vessels, and generally.
(6) As a matter of public policy-it had the right and responsibility to strike a blow against drug use and abuse-for societal
reasons.
The Union objected and grieved on the following grounds:
(1)

Random testing violated basic Fourth Amendment
24
rights-and as codified in the privacy laws of Maine.
(2) The Company's policy breached basic safeguards of confidentiality-medical technicians were not qualified to take and
test urine-the process was an indignity and reputations were
damaged regardless of the outcome.
(3) The EMIT test is notoriously inaccurate-and there are significant inaccuracies in the GC/MS confirmation test.
(4) The definition of "impairment" or "under the influence" is
inaccurate and not supported by medical authority.
(5) "Probable cause" or "reasonable basis" for testing not adequately defined and subject to discriminatory application by
supervisors.
(6) The unilateral Substance Abuse Policy was an unfair labor
practice-because as a "condition of employment" it had to
be bilaterally bargained with the Unions-under the NLRA.
At the outset of the arbitration hearings, the Company announced that it would not engage in random testing. This decision
24. The union urged the application of the concepts of the Fourth Amendment-even
though it technically applies to government employees-and the Bath employees were private.
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was consistent with the application of Fourth Amendment concepts-or laws of privacy covering private employees of the type employed at Bath, namely employees who do not have a clear, immediate and direct responsibility for the safety and welfare of the public.
Technically the Fourth Amendment prohibiting illegal search and
seizure applies only to employees of the government. 25 However, its
concept-and its codification into State privacy laws-seem to prohibit random, indiscriminate urine testing in the absence of some
reasonable suspicion that the affected employee is using drugs.26
This is consistent with the ruling of the federal district court of New
Jersey, enjoining "mass, round-up urinalysis" testing of firemen and
policemen in Plainfield, New Jersey" as an intrusion on "reasonable
expectations" of privacy and a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the constitution.27
Of course, it can be sensibly argued that police and firemen fall
within-a class that has a special duty for the safety and welfare of
the public-warranting random testing as well as testing when
"probable cause" exists. However, the matter is by no means well
settled."' For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab,29 a federal district court in 1986 enjoined the U.S. Customs Service from random testing. The court held that it would not
allow the defendants to condition receipt of Federal employment
upon waiver of Fourth Amendment and other constitutional rights.
Moreover, the court indicated that the public interest would best be
served by putting an immediate and permanent end to the Customs'
plan. a"
25. [T]he Fourth Amendment operates as a limitation upon the exercise of federal
power regardless of whether the State in whose jurisdiction that power is exercised
would prohibit or penalize the identical act if engaged in by a private citizen. It
guarantees to citizens of the United States the absolute right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 342 (1970).
26. See Caputa v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.C. N.J. 1986) (mass testing
requiring urination in the presence of a government agent violated the employees' reasonable
expectation of privacy); but see Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. Ga. 1985)
(testing of employees who worked on high voltage wires upheld due to reasonable suspicion of
drug use).
27. Caputa v. City of Plainfield at 1517.
28. See supra notes 14 and 15.
29. 649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986).
30. However, on appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed 815 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though they considered the testing a search, it was a reasonable search and thus not violative
of the Fourth Amendment. Testing urine for the presence of drugs was not violative of the
privilege against self-incrimination and the test used (EMIT in conjunction with gas chromatography/mass spectrometry) was highly reliable. As such, due process was not violated
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In Penny v. City of Chattanooga,31 in 1986, the district court in
Tennessee enjoined the administration of urine tests to all members
of the police and fire departments of the City of3' Chattanooga
as an
"unbridled violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2
In Jones v. McKenzie,33 the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia found that subjecting a discharged school bus attendant to a urinalysis violated her Fourth Amendment rights. It
stated that she was not subject to a standard more stringent than

those required of local police and bus drivers-and they were subject
to "urinalysis only upon reasonable suspicion of use of drugs. . ....
In McDonell v. Hunter,35 a district court in Iowa in 1985 held
that in a correctional facility "prisoners, visitors and employees do
not lose all their Fourth Amendment rights at the prison gates"3 6

and that strip searches and production of urine and blood specimens
was beyond constitutional reasonableness."7
In IBEW Local 1900 v. Potomac Electrical Power Company, 8
the D.C. District Court temporarily enjoined random urine testing in
the absence of an industry practice-because the Union was likely to
prevail in arbitration and a lawsuit-while employees subject to testing would be harmed without possibility of repair.39
(i.e.-there was a much lower chance for false-positive results). The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorary. 56 U.S.L.W. 3590 (Feb. 29, 1988).
31. 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
32. Id. at 817.
33. 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1 IER Cases (BNA) 1076 (D.D.C. 1986).
34. Id. at 1508. However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that it was not unreasonable for the school system to require drug testing of its employees
where:
(a) the employees' duties have a direct impact on the physical safety of young
school children; (b) the testing is conducted as part of a routine, reasonably required, employment-related medical examination; and (c) the test employed is one
that has a nexus to the employer's legitimate safety concern.
833 F.2d 335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
35. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
36. Id. at 1128.
37. "[S]earches and seizures can yield a vealth of information useful to the
searcher .

. .

. That potential, however, does not make a governmental employer's search of

an employee a constitutionally reasonable one." Id. at 1130. On appeal, the Eight Circuit
upheld the District Court's opinion, with the modification that urinalysis testing could take
place where there was a "reasonable suspicion . . . that controlled substances [had] been used
within the twenty-four hour period prior to the required test." 809 F.2d 1302, 1309 (8th Cir.
1987).
38. 121 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3071 (D.D.C. 1986).
39. "[A]bsent arbitration the employees whose privacy will be invaded by these proposed actions could not be made whole. . . . In my opinion, the plaintiff is likely to prevail on
the merits of this lawsuit." Id. at 3072. However, plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction was denied. The court reasoned that the change in the company's rules (which plain-
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In Patchoque Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Education,4" the court found that compelling a urine specimen was a
search under the Fourth Amendment. The court stated that, absent
any basis for suspicion that a probationary teacher eligible for tenure
was illegally using a controlled substance, it would be unconstitutional to demand urine.4"
However, where the employee has a direct responsibility for the
safety of the public, or where the industry is "regulated in the public
interest," courts are less likely to find Fourth Amendment or privacy
restrictions on random testing."2 Apparently, Bath Iron Works did
not think it or its employees fell into that category. Hence, in Northwest Airlines Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association,4 a the district court
found that an arbitration board exceeded its authority in reinstating
a pilot who had violated the 24 hour rule against drinking alcohol.
The court stated that public policy favored the safest air transportation possible over arbitration of labor disputes." No doubt in my
judgment, it would apply the same rule to random urine testing of
airline pilots.
In Shoemaker v. Handel,45 a district court upheld the New
Jersey Racing Commission rules requiring random testing of jockeys.
The Court balanced the privacy expectations of the jockeys with
"their participation in a special class of relatively unique industries
which have been subject to pervasive and continuous regulation by
the State

. .

.and which temper the protection jockeys may antici-

' '
pate from the Fourth Amendment. ""

tiff alleged were more intrusive) would not violate the integrity of the arbitration process. 634
F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).
40. 119 A.D. 2d 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888 (2d Dept. 1986).
41. "Strikingly absent from the record is even a scintilla of suspicion, much less reasona-

ble suspicion. We conclude, based on the record before us, that the ordering of a urine test for
drug abuse was an act of pure bureaucratic caprice." Id. at 891.
42. See Policemen's Benevelent Assn. Local 318 v. Washington, 3 IER Cases (BNA)
699 (3rd Cir. 1988); Transportation Workers v. SEPTA, 678 F. Supp. 543, 2 IER Cases
(BNA) 1804 (E.D. Pa. 1988); McDonnell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); Shoe-

maker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
43. 633 F. Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1985).

44. Id. at 791-796.
45. 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D. N.J. 1985).

46. The court also discussed their concern regarding regulation of the sport:
The danger of clandestine and dishonest activity inherent in the business of horse
racing has been well recognized . .

.

. Corruption in horse racing activities is re-

garded as an affront to a publicly sponsored sport with the potential of far reaching
consequences *** [T]he state has a vital interest in ensuring that horse races are
safely and honestly run and that the public perceives them as so.

Id. at 1100-1102. The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd
Cir. 1986).
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In Allen v. City of Marietta47 and in Murray v. Brooklyn Union

Gas Company,4 8 the courts upheld random urine testing of those em-

ployees engaged in dangerous work close to high voltage wires.49 The
Seventh Circuit, in Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 50 upheld

random testing of bus drivers because of a profound duty to provide
safe transportation to the citizenry. 5x
In sum, I think we can conclude that in public and private employment random urine testing may run afoul of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments and state privacy laws, unless the nature of

the employment has, as a direct responsibility or consequence, the
public safety or obvious work-related dangers or is a regulated
industry.
Hence, the probability of the validity of random testing of airline pilots,52 air controllers,5 bus drivers,54 train motormen, 55 atomic
energy plant workers,56 military personnel 57 explains the present ban
47. 601 F. Supp. 482 (D.C. Ga. 1985).
48. 122 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2057 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986).
49. In Allen, the court reasoned that "[t]he City [had] a right to make warrantless
searches of its employees for the purpose of determining whether they are using or abusing
their work with hazardous materials [high voltage wires]." Id. at 491. However, in Murray,
the court issued a temporary restraining order against the gas company regarding implementation of its random drug testing program pending arbitration.
50. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
51. "Certainly the public interest in the safety of mass transit riders outweighs any individual interest in refusing to disclose physical evidence of intoxication or drug abuse." Id. at
1267.
52. The Department of Transportation recently required all commercial airlines to conduct drug tests, even random screening for all employees in sensitive safety-and-security related jobs. Commercial airline pilots were included in the list of employees to be tested. Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 1 (March 15, 1988).
53. Id.
54. The Federal Highway Commission has proposed mandatory and random drug testing of truck and bus drivers transporting dangerous cargo or operating in interstate commerce.
Approximately five million commercial drivers would be covered by these proposed regulations.
Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 2 (July 5, 1988).
55. The Department of Transportation has proposed regulation which would provide for
the random and mandatory drug testing of 120,000 private-sector railroad employers. Employers would be allowed to design their own programs. The 21 major rail carriers and 300 smaller
lines would be required to test at least 15 percent of train and railroad yard crews, signal
installers, dispatchers, and maintenance employees. Individual Employment Rights, (BNA)
pp. 1-2 (May 24, 1988). But see RLEA v. Burnley, 839 F.2d 575, 2 IER cases (BNA) 1601
(9th Cir. 1988) (testing of railroad employees after certain types of accidents deemed unreasonable search).
56. On July 1, 1988, the Philadelphia Electric Company adopted a "zero tolerance"
drug policy. This policy coves 4,000 workers and executives and allows for random testing. In
addition, any employee caught stealing, using, or selling drugs on company premises will be
fired. The mandatory firing can be avoided by employees who voluntarily seek drug counseling
and treatment through the company. Individual Employment Rights, (BNA) p. 2 (July 2,

1988).
57. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit recently set aside an injunction against
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on random testing of baseball players,58 NFL players5 9 and all federal employees.6° The foregoing cases make clear, if only by dicta,
that urine testing is permitted when there is a "probable or reasonable suspicion" of drug use. I so ruled in the Bath Case, leaving to
litigation or arbitration on a case by case basis whether there was in
fact probable cause or a reasonable basis to require the test. I also
expressly provided for arbitral or judicial review of any employee or
union allegation that supervision arbitrarily decided probable cause
for discriminatory reasons.
Of course, probable cause or a reasonable basis [which I held
were synonymous terms], means an employee exhibiting strange, abhorrent behavior, suspicious physical and demeanor symptoms, personality changes, marked attendance or work deficiencies, as well as
direct evidence of drug use.
Hence, in Texas Utilities Generating Co.,61 an arbitrator reinstated an employee who resigned rather than undergo urinalysis. The
employee was not on duty at the time and was only briefly on the
Company's grounds while driving fellow workers to "clay pits"
where they sighted their rifles in preparation for the imminent squirrel hunting season. He said the supervisor lacked any "substantial
reason" to suppose a rule violation. There was no objective evidence
of drug use, and supervision lacked authority over the employee at
the time of the confrontation. The arbitrator said "in matters carrying the stigma of criminal conduct or even general social disapproval, a high degree of fairness supported by proof. . .must be applied. ' ' 62 In Everett v. Napper, 3 the District Court in Georgia held
that a fire fighter, who had reportedly purchased marijuana, was required to take a urine test. The court said that the urine testing was
random drug testing of Army civilians. The decision allowed the Army to test employees seeking new jobs and those that had been involved in accidents. NFEE v. Carlucci, 3 IER Cases

(BNA) 128 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
58.

See note 19, supra.

59. See note 18, supra.
60. Random testing of government employees is unconstitutional, except in special situations. See Policemen's Benevolent Assn. Local 318 v. Washington, 3 IER Cases (BNA) 699
(3d Cir. 1988); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir.
1987).
61. 82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 6 (1985) (Edes, Arb.)
62. Id. at 12 (Exact quote: "It has long been recognized that rules which pertain to
matters carrying the stigma of criminal conduct or even general social disapproval must be
applied with an especially high degree of fairness supported by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
63.

632 F. Supp. 1481 (N.D. Ga. 1986).
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a rational protection of the public welfare and property and there
64

was "sufficient rational justification for the test".
This is not to say that an employer cannot control drug use off
his premises and outside of working hours. He can-if that use carries over to and affects the employee's job performance such as "being impaired or under the influence" on the job from off the job use
of drugs.65 I so upheld that part of the Bath Substance Abuse
Policy.66
Extremely controversial, is the question of the accuracy of the
EMIT test even with confirmation. More particularly, the controversy centers on the amount of drugs, especially the most prevalent,
marijuana, that creates "impairment" or "under the influence." The
EMIT test has been discussed in many scholarly articles.6 7 The conclusions are that the EMIT Test is not fully accurate in measuring
how much of a certain drug is present. The EMIT test cannot tell

how long ago the drug was used. A variety of factors, physical and
psychological bear on the effect of the drug from individual to individual, and there are "a legion of reasons for false positive results." 68
64.

Id. at 1485.

65. I consider it proper and appropriate for the Company to take steps to protect
its work contracts; to protect the quality of its products; to protect the safety of its
employees; and to protect its productive integrity and general reputation by having a
policy and program designed to eliminate or reduce the possession and use of illegal
drugs in the work place, and the off-property use when such use adversely affects
the employee's job performance. That only a relative handful of employees may be
using drugs, including marijuana, does not mean that there is not legitimate reason
for a substance abuse policy and program. One purpose of the instance Policy is
prophylactic, designed to stop and discourage what use presently obtains, and to
prevent its proliferation. That is a legitimate objective. I am not persuaded that a
condition must become extensive or chronic before management may make a response and seek a remedy. An employer may have policies and regulations which for
example, prohibit excessive absenteeism, theft, insubordination, falsification of
records and fighting, without first showing a prevalence of those activities. So too
with regard to substance abuse.
See Note 21, supra at 3-4.
66. Id. at 8-9.
67. See Your Urine or Your Job: Is Private Employee Drug Urinalysis Constitutional in
California? 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1451 (1986); K. Englade, Who's Hired and Who's Fired:
That Decision May Rest on Laboratory Tests First-Are Genetic Screening Tests Next? Student Lawyer, pp. 20-27 (Apr. 1986); Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for Dramatic Legal
Collision between the Rights of Employers and Worker, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986; Committee
Reports: Drug Testing in the Workplace, 43 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, 401 (1988).
68. [M]any over-the-counter and lawful prescription medications, as well as ordinary food products, contain some amount of otherwise illegal drugs. Certain herbal
teas and some prescription antibiotics can produce a positive result for cocaine,
while Contact and Sudafed can indicate amphetamine use. . . .A certain incidence
of error is endemic to the EMIT test. . . .Another cause of false positives is labo-
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However in, National Federal of Federal Employees v. Weinberger,6 9 the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia
stated that the EMIT test followed by the gas chromotography mass
spectometry confirmation (GC/MS) test "has been accepted by the
scientific community as being the most reliable and acceptable
method for drug and drug metabolic identification.""0
In the District of Columbia school bus attendant case,7 1 a single, unconfirmed EMIT test was relied on by the school system. District Judge Oberdorfer found the termination "arbitrary and capricious" and imposed the condition that "before defendants can
terminate plaintiff again on the grounds of drug abuse, they must
confirm a positive EMIT test result by an alternative process such as
72
the two suggested by the manufacturer."
In Miciotta v. McMickens,7 3 a correction officer was dismissed
after urinalysis was positive for cocaine. The court found that a factual issue was raised by the officer who stated that the urine testing
was some other person's and not his. The question of whether or not
the urine test was properly administered had to be tried.
However, the petitioner in Curry v. New York City Transit Authority, 4 was not so fortunate. The railroad clerk was dismissed after quinine and morphine were discovered in her urine. She argued
that the substances were the result of ingesting prescription medication and tonic water. The dismissal was upheld, but Justice Weinstein in his dissent stated that there was no substantial evidence to
show that the chemicals were in the petitioner's urine for other than
75
valid reasons.
ratory mistakes. Error rates can increase if the testing laboratory is not certified or

the technicians are not properly trained.
Drug Testing in the Workplace, 43 Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York 447, 455-456 (1988).
69. 640 F. Supp. 642 (D.D.C. 1986).

70. Id. at 648. On appeal, the case was remanded so that the district court could determine the merits of the preliminary injunction motion and underlying claims. 818 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
71. See supra, note 32.
72. Id. at 1507.
73. 499 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
74. 450 N.Y.S.2d 399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
75. Judge Weinstein wrote:
Although respondent showed that there was no "free" codeine in the urine, respon-

dent failed to establish the absence of codeine in its "conjugated" form. The uncontroverted testimony of petitioner's expert was that codeine would be found "as a
conjugated compound" in the urine. Accordingly, there was not substantial evidence
to support a finding that the morphene and quinine were in petitioner's urine for
other than a valid medical reason, and the petition must be granted.
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In the Bath decision, I wrote:
The Unions have offered considerable testimony, evidence and argument designed to show that the EMIT test, even with GC/MS
confirmation can, in a certain percentage of cases, produce results
that are inaccurate, misleading or wrong. I accept the proposition
that these types of tests are not fully accurate and that errors can
and will be made. But my authority in this case is to decide
whether the Policy and Procedures, which include these tests is reasonable enough for Company-wide implementation. I do not conclude that the probability of some errors is enough to void these
tests as part of the Policy and Procedures. Indeed, a percentage of
error is probable for any type of test utilized. I am satisfied that
the EMIT test, with confirmation by GC/MS are sufficiently accurate and reliable to warrant sustaining their reasonableness as a
general part of the Policy and Procedures. Whether or not the
EMIT Test and the GC/MS confirmation is accurate for a particular affected employee and whether there are other acceptable explanations for any positive findings in any particular case are matters which may be contested and adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis as individual cases arise from the implementation of the Pol76
icy and Procedure.
But I went on to say, the definition of "under the influence" in
the Policy did not meet the test of reasonableness. I said:
Under this provision, an employee whose urine discloses the presence of 100 ng of Delta 9-THC acid metabolites following an
EMIT test is presumptively "under the influence" of marijuana,
and is deemed conclusively "under the influence" if the presence of
Delta 9-THC is confirmed by the laboratory GC/MS test. The
Company uses the 100 ng threshold level for the EMIT test to
"eliminate questionable test results based on minute or trace
amounts of illegal drugs. . ." and "to eliminate the possibility that
a positive test might result only from indirect drug use (i.e., passive
inhalation; e.g. smoke filled room, car pools, etc.)". I have no quarrel with the use of a threshold quantity for referral of the EMIT
test for laboratory confirmation and I have no quarrel with the 100
ng threshold level. My quarrel is with the Company's conclusion
that a level of 100 ng in the urine in the EMIT test, if confirmed
by the laboratory GC/MS test, means that the employee is "under
the influence." The expert testimony and evidence in this record is
extensive and scholarly. But it is sharply conflicting and off setting.
From the evidence, I cannot conclude that a level of 100 ng of
Id. at 400.
76. See note 21, supra at 13.
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Delta 9-THC acid in the urine, if confirmed, produces impairment,
mental or physical changes or other symptoms associated with being under the influence. In short, in this case as in others I have
heard involving the same question, the experts are in wide disagreement over what quantity of marijuana produces impairment, how
quickly, and for what period of time. The evidence in this case does
not conclusively show that a recording of 100 ng in the urine, if
confirmed, is synonymous with any mental or physical impairment.
Unfortunately, medical and pharmacological experts have not been
able to establish the quantity of marijuana in the urine, the blood,
or the system generally, that produces impairment of constitutes
"under the influence" as they have been able to do with alcohol.
So, if the Policy is left to stand unmodified in this regard, employees with confirmed positive tests at or above the 100 ng level
will be absolutely determined to be "impaired" or "under the influence" regardless of their objective mental and physical conditions,
and stigmatized with the "under the influence" diagnosis, when the
medical evidence remains equivocal and disputed. I think this is
arbitrary and unfair in a most sensitive and critical area. This is
not to say that use of marijuana does not impair the faculties. I am
convinced it does. Rather it is to say that the experts disagree on
the quantity required for impairment or for being "under the influence" and for how long impairment lasts from any given quantity.
On the other hand, for the company to have an effective policy, as it is entitled to have, some unacceptable or prohibited level
of marijuana or other drugs must and may be fixed. While I consider it unreasonable for the Company to deem 100 ng synonymous
with impairment or being under the influence of marijuana, with
the social stigma that attaches to any such finding, I do not consider it unreasonable for the Company to deem an EMIT test of
100 ng of Delta 9-THC acid, if confirmed, to be a prohibitedor an
unacceptable level of the drug, and to conclude that such a level
may cause impairment or may result in being under the influence.7
In addition, regarding the testing procedures, I wrote in the
Bath decision:
When an employee's urine is taken for the purpose of initially testing for drugs, a physician shall be present and shall supervise the
process. If a Company physician is not on duty at the time, the
local hospital facilities shall be used, and a physician at the hospital shall supervise the process. The supervising physician shall also
examine the affected employee physically for the presence or lack
of presence of other symptoms of drug use. By example, that exam77.

Id. at 15-17.
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ination should include a test of reflexes, examination of eyes, gait,
general demeanor, breath and condition of speech. The results of
the physical examination shall be included by the physician in a
report to the Company and shall be made part of the official record
of any disciplinary action imposed, and shall be available if the
matter is grieved, arbitrated or litigated."8
And on confidentiality I said:
The Policy's statement in Section E of Article VII is critical to
the administration of the entire Substance Abuse Policy and Procedures. The statement is worth repeating and emphasizing in this
Decision. It says:
"BIW is committed to implementing this policy in a fair and
equitable manner which respects the dignity and privacy of
the individual."
The Company's failure to do so would not only subvert the purpose
and objective of the Policy, but would constitute a grievable and
arbitrable breach of the Policy.79
A major issue in the Bath case, and one that I am surprised has
not yet reached the National Labor Relations Board or the Circuit
Courts on appeal from a Board ruling-probably because of "deferral"-is the question of whether a substance abuse policy is a "condition of employment" within the meaning of the National Labor
Relations Act, requiring bilateral bargaining under Sec. 8(a) (5),
8(d) or 9(a).80 However,
My answer in the Bath case was made simple by the existence
of two Company rules which were dispositive of the question and
which made unnecessary an answer to the basic issue of whether
the Policy, standing alone was a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. 8 ' Similarly, the Eighth Circuit 8 2 held that the railroad
78. Id. at 18-19.
79. Id. at 19-20.
80. 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.
Sec. 8(a)(5). To refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a).
Sec. 8(d). For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or
any question arising hereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.
81. I wrote:
Absent random testing for drugs, and against the backdrop of the pre-existing and
continuing Company Rules and Regulations Nos. 18 and 19, I do not find that the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1988

17

Hofstra
Labor
Law Journal Law Journal, Vol. 5, [Vol.
Hofstra
Labor
& Employment
Iss. 25:2
[1988], Art. 1

was permitted to administer drug tests to employees involved in
accidents and those returning to work after furlough or a long absence without negotiating the matter with the unions. 83 However,
in Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern
Railroad Co., 4 the district court prohibited a unilateral plan of the
carrier to use specially trained dogs to detect illicit substances on
employees. This "surveillance-search" program was held to be a
change in working conditions within the Railway Labor
Revised Policy and Procedures require bilateral bargaining under Sections 8(a)(5),
8(d) or 9(a) of the Act.
I so conclude because, contrary to the Union's assertion, I do not find the policy to
be a substantial or significant departure from Rules 18 and 19. Rules 18 and 19
read:
18. Use, possession, distribution, sale or offering for sale, of narcotics, dangerous drugs including marijuana or alcoholic beverages on Company
premises at any time.
First Offense: DISCHARGE
19. Being on Company premises under the influence of alcohol, narcotics,
or dangerous drugs including marijuana, or refusing to submit to a test
administered by the Medical Department to determine if under such
influence.
First Offense: 5 days off
Second Offense: DISCHARGE
Those rules were not bilaterally bargained but rather unilaterally legislated by the
Company, and actively enforced, over a period of time. The Unions have not and do
not in this proceeding challenge the propriety, effectiveness or validity of those
Rules. Indeed, there is no question that those two Rules have been accepted by the
Unions.
As I see it, the Revised Policy makes explicit, provides particularization and methodological implementation of managerial authority, that was and is implicit in Rules
18 and 19 standing alone.
Under Rules 18 and 19 the Company had the implicit right, under proper, relevant
and reasonable circumstances to utilize methods to determine if and when an employee did the proscribed acts of either or both Rules. To do so, I have little doubt
that the Company may conduct investigations and use medical tests. The Policy,
delineates the means, methods, procedures and standards that the Company will
(and must) follow, and in some specific respects may be more protective of the due
process rights and privacy considerations of the employees than rules 18 and 19
standing alone.
As Rules 18 and 19 were validly promulgated by the Company on a unilateral basis,
those more precise, delineated methods and procedures for the administration and
enforcement of the Rules are not significant variations from those Rules nor are
they new conditions of employment requiring bilateral bargaining under the Act.
See note 21, supra at 5-6, 11.
82. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employers Lodge 16 v. Burlington N. R.R.
Co., 802 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1986).
83. The court agreed with Burlington Northern's policy of ensuring the safety of its
operation. Due to the fact that several accidents were related to drugs, it was understandable
that the railroad had to "[expand] the scope of its post-incident testing as well as its periodic
and return-to-work medical examinations." Id. at 1024.
84. 620 F. Supp. 163 (D.C. Mont. 1985).
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Act-requiring bilateral bargaining.85
Frankly, had there not been Rules 18 and 19 in the Bath case,
I am reasonably certain that I would have found the Company's
Substance Abuse Policy, with its many controversial and disputable
provisions to be a new "condition of employment" within the meaning of the NLRA-and, I would have enjoined its unilateral implementation. I should note that the parties gave me the express
power to decide the unfair labor practice question as if I was the
NLRB.
An interesting remaining issue is whether an employer may

test for drugs as part of a pre-employment assessment of qualifications and eligibility. There is a general view that an employer-private or public, has wide ranging authority to test in a
whole variety of fields as a condition of hiring.8 6 It is well settled
that he may test for physical ability and condition, 87 for aptitude, 88
and for promotability. 89 But a closer look at those situations will
reveal that each pre-employment test had a reasonable relation and
is relevant to the job in question.80 Hence an intelligence or apti85. Even though the court prohibited the unilateral implementation of the plan, they
were not opposed to the plan per se. However, the court reasoned that "[t]he infringement
upon the rights secured by the members of the Brotherhood by their collective agreement with
the BN which the surveillance-search program at issue would entail constitutes, in the cologuial, the 'stuff' of which strikes are made." Id. at 173.
86. See notes 87-88, infra.
87. Waters v. Olinkraft, Inc., 475 F. Supp. 743, 21 FEP Cases 420 (D.C. Ark. 1979)
(welding skills test lawful); Wheeler v. City of Columbus, 686 F.2d 1144, 29 FEP Cases 1699
(5th Cir. 1982) (physical test for city job valid, even though results fell more harshly on fe-

male than male applicants); but see Berkman v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 177, 28 FEP
Cases 856 (D.C. N.Y. 1982) (firefighters physical exam in which 46 percent of males and 0
percent of females passed was not criterion valid); Cohen v. West Haven Bd. of Police Comrs.,
24 FEP Cases 1121 (D.C. Conn. 1978) (physical agility test for police officers which had
almost complete adverse impact on female was deemed invalid).
88. Cormier v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 519, F. Supp. 211, 26 FEP Cases 652 (D.C. La.
1981) (employers' use of Wonderlich Personnel Test & Bennett Mechanical Aptitude Test to
screen potential utility crew deemed did not discriminate against black applicants); Thomas v.
Basic Magnesia, Inc., 22 FEP Cases 1277 (D.C. Fla. 1975) (failure to hire black applicant
because she did poorly on typing test was lawful); but see Officers for Justice v. Civil Service
Comm., San Francisco, 473 F. Supp. 801, 22 FEP Cases 1704 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (City unlawfully failed to establish job-relatedness of written exam for sergeant and patrol officer which
has substantial adverse impact on minority-group applicants); Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d
666, 30 FEP Cases 1121 (11th Cir. 1983) (TVA violated Sec. 504 of Rehabilitation Act in
using written general Aptitude Test Battery rejecting dyslexic applicant and failing to allow
applicant to use oral test in order to adjust for his dyslexia).
89. Ligons v. Bechtel Power Corp., (8th Cir. 1980) (employer behaved lawfully in refusing to promote black employee who failed to pursue opportunity to upgrade his welding
qualifications).
90. Guardians Assn., New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Service Comm. City of New
York, 633 F.2d 232, 23 FEP Cases 677 (confidence in a particular test can be illustrated by
the relationship between the abilities sought to be tested and the job tasks in question).
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tude test unrelated to the job duties involved or unrelated to a potential promotional track, will be rejected by arbitrators and by the
courts. 1 A test of physical ability for a sedentary assignment is
likewise impermissable. 92 Therefore, I am persuaded that testing
for drugs-where there is no probable cause or suspicion to do so,
and where the jobs are not of the public safety type or inherently
dangerous, will be actionable and subject to judicial rejection.
I conclude with a checklist of what I think will be litigable or
arbitrable as drug testing continues and increases. Employers
should be prepared for these challenges on a case by case basis:
(1) The facts do not constitute "probable cause or reasonable basis" or that no special public interest or hazard or regulated
industry exist for random testing.
(2) Testing was carried out improperly with unqualified personnel. The chain of custody and analysis of the urine was not
maintained properly.
(3) The test results or the scientific methodology of the tests were
faulty as to the employee involved. A false positive result was
obtained.
(4) That any substance abuse policy was not uniformly and consistently applied to employees similarly situated.
(5) That a reasonable effort at confidentiality was not
maintained. '
(6) That in a collective bargaining situation the plan or policy
was not bilaterally bargained or at least bargained to impasse.
With that I conclude with the hope that this has been
informative.

91. Cf. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Comm., City & County of San Francisco,
473 F. Supp. 801, 22 FEP Cases 1704 (D.C. Cal. 1979) (city failed to establish relatedness of
written examination for positions of patrol officer and sergeant).
92. Cf. Harless v. Duck, 619 F. 2d 611, 22 FEP Cases (6th Cir. 1980) (police department failed to prove that physical ability test, which had significant adverse impact on females,
was job-related.)
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